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An Experimental Examination of
Labor Supply and Work Intensities
David L. Dickinson, Utah State University
Estimated negative substitution effects on work hours question the
empirical validity of the classical labor supply model. Estimates are
reconciled by allowing a dual choice of hours and effort for piece-
rate workers. In such a model, these negative substitution effects
result from substituting on- and off-the-job leisure. We test our
model using controlled experimentation on human subjects. These
experiments, while not naturally occurring environments, represent
real economic choices and can generate data unavailable elsewhere
(e.g., effort data). The results support our model, and they have
implications both for labor management and for empirical research
focusing only on the hours choice.
The classical static model of the labor-leisure choice offers positive com-
pensated wage effects on hours of work as its main testable implication.
Previous attempts to test this hypothesis with field data have cast doubt
on the empirical validity of the static labor supply model due to the
frequency of negative estimated compensated wage elasticities. A limita-
tion of the model is that it views the choice of hours of work as the only
I would like to thank Jim Cox, Ron Oaxaca, Leslie Stratton, Price Fishback,
Devajyoti Ghose, and Mary-Anne Sillamaa for many helpful comments. I would
also like to thank the participants of the Economic Science Association conference
as well as those of the Experimental Economics seminars and workshops at the
University of Arizona for their valuable comments. Finally, I thank the Economic
Science Laboratory and the Department of Economics at the University of
Arizona, and the Olin Foundation for funding the experiments for this article.
Address correspondence to the author at the Department of Economics, Utah
State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530. All errors in this
article are my own responsibility.
[Journal of Labor Economics, 1999, vol. 17, no. 4, pt. 1]
© 1999 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0734-306X/1999/1704-0007$02.50
638
Labor Supply and Work Intensities 639
margin of interest, when in fact many workers make calculated decisions
about the intensity or effort with which they work.
This article examines two extensions of the static model. In one model,
hours of work are fixed while work effort is the choice variable, and in the
other model workers choose both hours of work and work effort. These
models admit the consumption of on-the-job leisure by allowing work
effort to vary: a type of leisure not included in the classical theory. In both
models workers earn piece-rate wages. In the first model (where workers
choose effort), the testable implication is that income-compensated wage
increases will increase work effort. In the second model (where workers
choose both effort and hours of work), income-compensated wage in-
creases may actually decrease hours of work under the plausible assump-
tion that workers substitute on- and off-the-job leisure. It is this possi-
bility of theoretical negative substitution effects on hours worked with
piece-rate wages that motivates a test of the implications of the model.
Both models arc tested (in Sec. IV) using controlled laboratory exper-
imentation on human subject workers. In general, there are always ben-
efits and drawbacks to a specific methodological approach. One draw-
back in using controlled experimentation for theory testing is that the
data sets are usually smaller than field experiment or survey data sets.
Also, the fact that individuals arc not participating in the "naturally
occurring" economic environments we wish to study may question our
ability to extend experimental results to other settings.
However, the benefits (at least for certain types of studies) are impres-
sive. The controlled setting of the experiments greatly reduces the vari-
ables that may be confounding the results derived from data generated in
more uncontrolled settings. Also, for this particular study, there exists no
naturally occurring data set that provides the sufficient level of informa-
tion on both hours of work and work effort. Such data could possibly be
generated, but it is not clear how unbiased data on work effort could be
acquired (along with work hours data), and the cost could be quite high.
For the purpose of comparison, a single wave of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) costs roughly $34 per observation, which is slightly higher
than the approximate $24 per observation cost of these experiments.^ In
addition to higher per observation costs, one wave of the CPS does not
yield detailed data on work effort and must also rely on unbiased report-
ing by participants. The experiments reported in this article elicit actual
' Of this, field costs are approximately $25 per person. Figures are from the
U.S. Census Bureau and are all meant to be interpreted with caution as they do
contain "noise." The figure ($34 per observation) is basically the CPS's total
annual operating costs divided by the number of annual surveys. These figures do
not include any CPS start-up costs.
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labor-leisure behavioral responses and include the detailed data on work
effort needed for this study.
It is also fair to note that one wave of the CPS (or the Panel Study for
Income Dynamics [PSID], or the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
[NLSY], etc.) is an ongoing survey, whereas the experiments in this article
were completed in a short period of time. A comparison with a more
ambitious field study, the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments,
shows how truly expensive a complete field experiment can be. The cost
of the NIT experiments was roughly $338 million (1996 dollars). The
experiments presented in this article cost about $3,000 in 1996. While
admittedly a much smaller data set, the per person cost is still most
economical—about $73 per person compared to $23,488 per person for
the NIT experiments.'^ Furthermore, subjects in these controlled labora-
tory experiments participate in an economic environment that is mean-
ingful because of the monetary payments that are tied directly to their
decisions. Such environments can be tailor-made to collect the type of
data needed for a particular study, and, as we have seen, these experiments
are cost effective. In general, experimentally collected data should be
viewed as a complement to survey and field data, not a substitute. To
address the issues discussed in this article, however, any data collected
must contain sufficient information on both hours worked and work
effort.
The results of this study show that when hours of work are not a choice
variable—a possibility that describes many short-run labor supply deci-
sions—work effort on the job decreases, given an income-compensated
wage decrease (in 11 of 15 cases), thereby supporting the first extension of
the model. This has obvious implications (on worker effort levels) for
managers who may alter wages and the nonwage compensation of their
work force. When both work effort and hours of work are a choice
variable, eight of 26 subjects display negative substitution effects on hours
of work. These are not estimated effects but, rather, observed substitution
effects from a wage change that is decomposed across multiple experi-
mental work days. Such results support the extended model of labor-
leisure choice and imply that future studies should recognize on-the-job
leisure whenever possible. Moreover, existing studies with estimated negative
^ This figure is based on a total of 8,746 families enrolled in the four NIT
experiments reported in Robins (1985). Families other than single-headed families
consisted of two individuals (husband and wife) and are counted as such since
both husband and wife data are exploited in the data analysis of the NIT
experiments. Even if one eliminates the administrative costs and focuses only on
direct subject payments, the NIT experiments averaged $6,583 per person in 1996
dollars.
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substitution effects on hours worked may consider exploring these on-the-
job leisure implications of piece-rate paid workers in their data.
I. Previous Studies of the Labor-Leisure Decision
Typical empirical studies have estimated equations of the form dh/dw
= {dh/dw)\^=^ + h (dh/dm), where h is hours of work, w is an hourly
wage, and m is income. This is the typical Slutsky equation that decom-
poses the wage change into a substitution and an income effect. Multi-
plying through by w/h gives us the elasticity version of the equation that
can be concisely written as iq = TI5 + (wh/m) • '^h„, where T| is the
uncompensated wage elasticity, T]^ is the compensated wage elasticity
(theoretically predicted to be positive), and {wh/m) • TIA „, is referred to as
the total income elasticity. Surveys of empirical studies in Pencavel (1986)
and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) look at the labor supply of men
and women, respectively. Estimation of TI^ for men from U.S. and British
nonexperimental data show -^g is estimated to be positive mostly, with an
average estimate of less than .30. Estimated compensated wage elasticities
are positive and slightly higher when using experimental data from the
NIT experiments.^ There is also a tendency for T̂  > 0, implying positively
sloped labor supply functions. One cannot help but notice, however, the
number of negative estimates oi •x\s in existing studies."* These estimates
violate the key prediction of the static labor supply model. The same basic
conclusion with respect to estimated values of T]^ is found in Killings-
worth and Heckman's survey of female labor supply. They report mostly
positive estimates of "(\s and T) with some notable exceptions. It is the
quantity of negative estimates of TI^ that casts doubt on the empirical
validity of the static labor supply model.
Other empirical studies involve less standard data sets.^ Battalio et al.
(1981) and Battalio, Green, and Kagel (1981) test the static labor supply
model using pigeons and find positive compensated wage effects in gen-
eral. Their experiments represent a very controlled test of the theory and.
•* The reader interested in a detailed discussion of field labor supply experiments
and their statistical analysis is directed to Spiegelman and Yaeger (1980), Moffit
and Kenhrer (1981), and Robins (1985).
"* Examples of studies which yield negative estimates of "n̂  include Atkinson
and Stern (1980) and Ham (1982) on male labor supply, and Nakamura and
Nakamura (1981) and Robinson and Tomes (1985) on female labor supply.
^ Some creative field studies address the labor supply issue but do not decom-
pose the wage change. Camerer et al. (1997) estimated uncompensated wage
elasticities of New York City cab drivers. Other studies use laboratory experi-
mentation to study rat labor supply using ethanol solution as payments (Collier
and Jennings [1969]; Collier, Hirsch, and Hamlin [1972]; and Meisch and Thomp-
son [1972, 1973]). Still others use human subjects with alcohol (Bigelow and
Liebson [1972]) or nicotine reinforcements (Bickel et al. [1991]).
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although not standard in their use of nonhuman subjects, are not subject
to some of the experimental criticisms of the NIT experiments (e.g., the
nonrandom subject/treatment assignments implicit in choosing only rural
or low-income populations for some treatments). Consistent with other
empirical studies, they also observe a backward-bending labor supply
curve at higher wages. Nonetheless, a limitation of these laboratory and
empirical studies is that they do not examine the labor-leisure choice
while allowing workers to choose both hours of work and work effort—a
choice that is clearly possible in work settings in which hours of work are
chosen.
Work effort has been examined mainly at the theoretical level in
efficiency wage models.^ A survey by Yellen (1984) presents the relevance
of such models in explaining involuntary unemployment and other styl-
ized labor market facts. In such models, work effort is typically the only
choice variable. There are some exceptions, however. For example, Lazear
(1981) presents a model where worker productivity is variable. He ex-
amines how flexible hours contracts interact with workers' value marginal
product (i.e., worker effort) on the job, and he recognizes that wage rates
are able to allocate both hours of work and output per hour of a worker.''
He does not address the issue of compensated wage changes—the main
point at issue when evaluating the classical labor supply model. Pencavel
(1977), however, does discuss (utility) compensated wage changes.
Pencavel examines a work effort model in which both effort and hours
worked at a piece-rate job are inputs to a worker production function.
The choice of work effort leads to ambiguously signed compensated wage
effects on both work effort and hours worked. As we will see in the next
section, I present a model that generates the same general prediction but
with the following differences. First, in the Combined Model presented in
Section II of this article, we derive results for income-compensated wage
effects, whereas Pencavel's results are for utility-compensated wage ef-
fects. Also, Pencavel claims that the "strong substitution" of hours
worked and work effort generates negative substitution effects. By
"strong substitution" he means that an increase in hours worked will
decrease effort. Our results show that substitution effects on hours of
work are negative if the additional consumption of on-the-job leisure
reduces the marginal utility of off-the-job leisure. This is not the same as
saying that additional consumption of on-the-job leisure will reduce the
consumption of off-the-job leisure. Furthermore, Pencavel seems to im-
* Robbins (1930) does look at work effort and argues in favor of a backward-
bending labor supply curve in terms of effort and income.
In his model, he shows that no flexible hours contract exists that increases
utility of the workers (relative to a constrained hours contract) and increases firm
profits.
Labor Supply and Work Intensities 643
ply that if the substitution effect on either hours or effort is negative, then
the other must be also. This is not the case in the Combined Model. These
differences may seem trivial, but empirical results from this article sup-
port the Combined Model where they fail to support the model in
Pencavel. For example, only half of our experimental subjects had sub-
stitution effects on work hours and effort of the same sign (for that
subject). Moreover, of those whose effort decreased (increased) when
hours worked increased (decreased), given a compensated wage change,
only 25% displayed the anomalous negative substitution effect on hours
of work. Both of these facts lend more support to the model extension in
this article than to the model in Pencavel.
An exception to the predominantly theoretical literature on work effort
is the growing body of empirical literature on work effort and piece-rate
wage incentives. Oettinger (1998) examines the labor participation elas-
ticity of baseball stadium vendors and finds that the participation elastic-
ity is "positive and substantial." Lazear (1998) and Paarsch and Shearer
(1998(i and 1998^) use data sets in which employers switch from hourly
or daily wage rates to piece rates. Lazear examines behavior at a large
auto-glass installation company, while Paarsch and Shearer utilize data
from a Canadian tree-planting firm. These studies, in addition to this
article, all offer empirical support for the incentive effects of piece-rate
wages. In addition, Lazear finds that piece rates attract a higher-ability
work force and Paarsch and Shearer report that piece rates can also lead
to fatigue (1998^) and lower quality of work (1998<«).
Overall, the empirical literature has not carefully examined labor-
leisure choices that include both the hours of work choice and the work
effort choice. Whether or not individuals behave according to any theory
that includes both of these margins of interest remains an empirical
question. Field studies are limited in their ability to provide the data
required to answer this question. As such, controlled laboratory experi-
mentation allows us to collect the data we need in a more controlled and
cost-effective way in order to gain at least a preliminary understanding of
behavior in this setting.
II. The Combined Model of Hours Worked and
Work Intensity
The classical theory of labor supply assumes that time not spent at
work is leisure time. It is clear that leisure can be consumed at work in
multiple forms: coffee breaks, staring out the window on a sunny day,
office gossip, etc. Let us then assume that utility is a function of con-
sumption (c), hours of work {h), and productive hours at work [b.^). Let
the time constraint remain b + I = T, where 7 is exogenous total time
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available.^ Also let h = h,^ + hi where h,^ is time spent actually working
and hi is hours of on-the-job leisure. Utility is now U = (c, Z?̂ , hi),
where dU/dc > 0, dU/dhi > 0, dU/dh^ < 0. The budget constraint is
now F + wh,^ = pc, implying that w is a piece-rate wage (i.e., a wage per
hour of productive work). Piece-rate (or quasi piece-rate) wages are
actually quite commonplace in natural work environments and include
contract work, fruit and vegetable picking, waiting tables and other work
that pays tips (since tips are the majority of the workers' pay), and a wide
variety of sales jobs that pay on commission.
This framework allows us to consider three different cases. First, we have
the classical labor supply model when hi = 0 (i.e., h,^ = h) and workers
choose just h. The Slutsky equation is then dh/dw = {dh/dw)\,n=^
+ h {dh/dm), where m = m refers to the total income compensation. As
usual, the Slutsky substitution effect will be positive, given well-behaved
preferences, and the income effect will be positive (negative) for a normal
(inferior) good.
Unfortunately, most laborers do not have the choice to vary the leisure
they consume daily by merely leaving work earlier or later. Akhough this
may be possible in the long run by choosing different jobs, it is not how
we would usually describe short-run work behavior. Altonji and Paxson
(1986) note that much of the variance in hours worked is associated with
the jobs themselves and is therefore not at the discretion of the employee.
In other words, firms many times have strong preferences for the hours
worked by their employees. It is then the case that h is fixed exogenously
by the employer, and the choice variable is now /?^. ' This second case,
which we will call the Intensity Model, yields as Slutsky equation
dw dw —.
(1)
Given that dU/dh^ < 0, we would also predict positive substitution
effects (and compensated wage elasticities) for work effort in the Intensity
Model. A similar prediction is found in Pencavel (1977). Such a prediction
has important implications for personnel management since it implies that
* Of course, it would be incorrect to say then that all time away from "work"
is leisure. Household production is not considered in this article. The interested
reader is directed to Becker (1965).
This way of framing the labor-leisure choice for experimentation was sug-
gested by Cameron Rookley. The idea of consuming leisure at work, however, has
been around for a long time. Lewis (1957) notices that leisure is not homogenous,
and casual observation that most individuals prefer "at home" leisure to "at work"
leisure can be attributed, at least in part, to work facilities and their offerings of
leisure choices.
Labor Supply and Work Intensities 645
on-the-job work effort could be increased while holding total compen-
sation (income) constant, at a base effort level, by implementing a com-
pensated wage increase. We will directly test this prediction with one of
the experimental designs presented in the following section. If it is true,
though, that the Intensity Model applies to worker choice, and we
estimated wage equations based on measures of hours of work, then
calculated elasticities should be reevaluated. In such a scenario, an esti-
mated substitution effect on h is not measuring the response of workers
to compensated wage changes (since in this model, there is no choice and
therefore no changing of h by the worker). Rather, it would be measuring
employers' willingness to offer different work schedules for different
wages at different jobs. This may be of interest as well, but it misses the
point of how wage changes affect worker behavior—through changes in
work effort.
For those jobs that allow hours of work choice, recall that the classical
model does not allow individuals to enjoy on-the-job leisure. In reality,
an employer cannot preclude employees from enjoying some on-the-job
leisure even when they may choose how long they stay at work. Lewis
(1957) notes that, while some argue that mixing business with pleasure
spoils both, it apparently does not completely spoil both, given the
existence of many forms of on-the-job leisure.^" Let us call the model
where individuals choose both hours of work and productive hours at
work (or hours of on- and off-the-job leisure) the Combined Model of
labor supply. While the earlier derivation of the income-compensated
Slutsky equation for the classical model was not presented due to the
widespread use of the model (and, similarly, the derivation of the Inten-
sity Model Slutsky equation is a straightforward extension of the classical
model), the reader is directed to appendix A for a more complete and
thorough derivation of the Slutsky equation for the Combined Model of
labor supply. To facilitate the process, we cast the model in terms of
"goods," and below we present the abbreviated results of this three-good
maximization problem—the goods being consumption, off-the-job lei-
sure, and on-the-job leisure.
For notational simplicity, let us call c, I, and hi goods 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, and let /? = 1 be the numeraire. We can more fully take
advantage of the implication of utility maximization when the problem is
defined in terms of these three "goods." Notice, however, that an indi-
vidual's choice of these three goods must necessarily determine a choice
of h and h.^ as well. First and second order derivatives will be denoted as
numbered subscripts. For example, U•^ is the marginal utility of consump-
'° Lewis (1957) discusses the possibility that travel costs (to leisure choices)
may influence the leisure mix as well.
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tion, and [/23 — ^32 is the change in the marginal utility of off-the-job
leisure hours with respect to a change in on-the-job leisure time. Conse-
quently, from the time constraint T = h + I, the sign of the income-
compensated substitution effect on leisure hours, /, will be the opposite of
the sign of the substitution effect on work hours, h. Let us also assume
quasi concavity of the utility function. The first-order conditions of the
constrained three-good maximization problem combined with the im-
plicit function theorem allow us to write the labor supply solutions to the
maximization problem as
h = h{w, F) (2)
and
h^ = h^iw, F). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) result from the leisure choice solutions / = l{w, F)
and hi = hi{w, F), and these functions are more complicated than
before." We can write our newest Combined income-compensated
Slutsky equation (on leisure hours) as
dl\\ ^ dl_\_ _ 1 L ^^
=m '*' '
where X. is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, | / | is the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix defined by the system of equations in
the first-order conditions of the maximization problem (which is guar-
anteed <0, given utility maximization), and again t/,y represents the
appropriate second-order derivative of the utility function with respect to
variables i und j (where U^j = f/-,).
The first term in brackets in equation (4) is the new combined Slutsky
substitution effect on off-the-job leisure hours.'^ The salient result is that,
in the Combined Model, we cannot theoretically sign the substitution
effect. While this is relevant, given the fact that there exist many different
types of piece-rate wage labor, the result does not hold for an hourly
wage scheme.'-' In general, the income effect has no theoretical sign, as is
" The difference lies in the fact that one price (the wage) motivates decisions on
two goods (/ and hi) in the Combined Model. The substantially more complex
Slutsky equation results from extensive second-derivative interaction among the
choice variables.
'^ A symmetric equation can be derived for the effect of a wage change on hi.
'̂  When one considers the classical model that is nested in the framework of
this article, piece-rate wages are identical to hourly wages since effort is fixed. The
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true in the classical model (see the expanded term in app. A). If off-the-
job leisure is a normal good, then the income effect on / will be positive.
To see that the Combined Model can produce theoretically negative
substitution effects on hours of work, it will suffice to show that we can
have theoretically positive substitution effects on hours of leisure. From
the complete derivation (app. A) we see that the full substitution effect
terms for off-the-job leisure, /, and on-the-job leisure, hi, can be arranged
and written as
dw
dl
dw .2)] , (5)
dwjl \\dw
where (dl/dw)\'^=m would be the usual (negatively signed) substitution
effect on /, and
(6)
where (dhi/dw)^^^, would be the usual (negatively signed) substitution
effect on hi. Notice the symmetry in equations (5) and (6). It is obvious
from the possible combinations of signs in the second portion of the
substitution effect in equation (5) that this portion could be positive and,
if stronger than the negative portion of the substitution effect, could
create an overall positive substitution effect on / (or on /?; in eq. [6]). Such
a positive substitution effect on / would guarantee a negative substitution
effect on h.
The next question to follow is: what are the assumptions necessary for
a negative substitution effect on hours of work? To answer this, we
exploit the fact that we could combine some terms (see app. A) and
rewrite equation (5) as
results of the Combined Model, however, do not all hold for hourly wages. If this
same model considers hourly wages, and workers choose h and h.^, then the
compensated wage effect on hours of work is guaranteed to be positive, while the
effect on work effort is ambiguous. Therefore, the interaction of h and h^ still
leads to some ambiguity of results, but the ambiguity is in the compensated wage
effect on work effort, not on hours of work. It is therefore important to be able
to identify from field data whether wages are predominantly piece rate or hourly
in terms of interpreting the results of the classical model. Even with hourly pay,
however, the full effect of a wage change on the "work" decision is incomplete if
on-the-job leisure is prevalent and ignored.
\dw
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/23 - f/33]. (7)
Equation (6) can be rewritten as
'dhA
= n T M f / u - f / 3 , ) + f/32-f/22]. (8)
Let us start by looking at a simplified case where we assume that there
is no second-derivative interaction between either of the leisure goods and
the consumption good (i.e., f/12 = ^̂ 13 = 0)- In this case the combined
substitution effects in equations (7) and (8) will be positive if, respectively,
^23 < f/33 and f/32 < f/22-''* Notice that this implies that C/23 (= C/32)
is negative, which is sufficient under these assumptions to give a positive
sign to the second portion of the combined substitution effects from
equations (5) and (6). In terms of the compensated wage effect on hours
of work, we can summarize the simplified case by saying that 7̂23 < 0 is
a necessary condition for a negative substitution effect on hours of work,
and [/23 < f/33 is a sufficient condition. One example of a specific utility
function that would generate such results would be U{c, I, hi)
= c + (hi/l) + ln (/). Here, all the assumptions of the simplified case
are met as long as / > 2hi (again, reasonable considering what / and hi
refer to).
What does it mean for t/23 to be negative? It seems reasonable to
assume that if on- and off-the-job leisure are substitutes then the addi-
tional consumption of one of these leisure goods would reduce the
marginal utility of the other. So, we would then predict positive substi-
tution effects on / and hi if the decrease in marginal utility from consum-
ing the "other" type of leisure is stronger than the own-good diminishing
marginal utility (i.e., U23 < t/33 and i732 < 1/22)- Such a condition might
'̂' These same restrictions would also guarantee that the income effects on these
two types of leisure are negative (i,e,, inferior leisure goods). To see this, notice
that we can expand the income-effect equations to get
dl - 1
^ = -jyj-[wf/u(f/33 - f/23) + Mt/,3t/,2 - U],) + £73, t/23 - t/,2t/33]
and
Under the simplified assumptions, these reduce to dl/dF = (-1/|/|) [wt/,,(t/33
- t/23)] and dh,/dF = (l/l/l [wUuiUn - t/^^)]. Therefore, if t/^j < t/33 and
t/32 < t/22, then both leisure goods are inferior.
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be labeled "strong substitution."'^ With this strong substitution, consum-
ing more of one type of leisure would strongly reduce the marginal utility
that an individual would receive from consuming the other leisure good.
The theoretical implication of this strong leisure substitution is a negative
Slutsky substitution effect on hours of work, h.^^ This is the Combined
Model result that is at odds with the classical prediction under certain
plausible assumptions and piece-rate wages.
Of course, it may be that t/i2#o and/or U^-^^Q. In this case, we might
intuitively assume that U•^2 and [/j3 are positive. Why? Recall that good
1 is the consumption good, and if U^2 and f/13 are positive, then the
marginal utility of each type of leisure is increased by consuming more c.
It seems logical to conclude that either type of leisure and consumption,
which can be enjoyed at the same time, are complements, while on- and
off-the-job leisure, which cannot be consumed together, are substitutes. If
we still assume that f/23 < ^33) '̂ hen a positive combined substitution
effect on / results if t/21 > ^31 iî  equation (7).^'' In other words, we have
a positive substitution effect on / if off-the-job leisure is "more comple-
mentary" with consumption than is on-the-job leisure. From equation (7)
we see that this is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a positive
Combined Model substitution effect on / (i.e., a negative substitution
effect onh).
We conclude then that a negative compensated wage effect on hours of
work in our new Combined Slutsky equation (resulting from a positive
effect on hours of leisure) would result if off-the-job leisure is considered
more complementary to consumption than is on-the-job leisure, and if
on- and off-the-job leisure are "strong" substitutes. The sufficient con-
dition is that C/21 > ^13 and f/23 < ^33- "̂ ^̂ îs is a very intuitive result,
considering that the set of on-the-job leisure choices is often much more
restricted than the set of off-the-job leisure choices. Under the more
restrictive assumptions that U-^2 ~ ^13 ~ 0' ^^^^ '̂ ^e strong substitution
of / and hi are sufficient for a negative compensated wage effect on h.
Complementarity of these two leisure goods seems less intuitive. It only
makes sense if we can imagine how an increase in one type of leisure could
actually increase the marginal utility of consuming the other. This might
be the case if one type of leisure good is a prerequisite to consuming the
'^ Keep in mind that this is different from the strong substitution discussed
earlier in Pencavel (1977).
'^This does not, however, guarantee that the compensated wage effect for
on-the-job leisure is of a particular sign given that we do not assume that U22
= Uyy. Therefore, the sign of the compensated wage effect on productive work
hours, h.^, cannot be determined without making further assumptions.
'•̂  With these additional assumptions, income effects now have an indetermi-
nate sign, as is the case in the classical model.
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Other (e.g., taking time off at work to make dinner reservations and,
therefore, to avoid a wait at the restaurant).
IIL Experimental Designs
The two experimental designs used to test the implications of the
Intensity and Combined Models are called, respectively, the Intensity
Experiment and the Combined Experiment.^^ The Intensity Experiment
mimics many short-run work environments in which workers do not
choose their hours of work. In this environment we examine whether or
not there is any predictable wage effect on h.^. More specifically, a wage
change is decomposed across multiple experimental work days in order to
observe if substitution effects on work effort are positive as predicted. In
the Combined Experiment, we also decompose wage changes to observe
substitution effects. Here, negative substitution effects on h would favor
the Combined Model of labor supply over the classical labor supply
model that predicts only positive substitution effects on h. In both
designs, some subjects receive a wage increase and others receive a wage
decrease so that we can test whether or not increases and decreases are
responded to differently. First, we discuss several features that are com-
mon to both experiments.
Subjects are recruited for a 2-hour experiment each day for 4 days. The
first day of experimentation is to train the subjects in the work environ-
ment, and so only (the final) 3 days are discussed henceforth. Subjects
were all undergraduate students at the University of Arizona. The exper-
imental days are not consecutive primarily due to the recruiting difficul-
ties that arise with students who are scheduled for classes on 2 or 3 days
of the week, but all experimental days were completed for any given
subject within a 9-day period.^^ During each experiment, subjects per-
form a rather dull task in exchange for payment.'^" The task consists of
typing the same paragraph repeatedly for a fixed wage each time success-
fully typed and printed. Typing is a task that each individual is reasonably
capable of performing. To control for learning of a specific paragraph
across days, subjects type a different paragraph of the same difficulty level
'^ Copies of all experimental instructions are available from the author on
request.
" More specifically, subjects completed the 4-day experiment either during a
Monday-Wednesday-Friday-Monday sequence of days or a Tuesday-Thursday-
Tuesday-Thursday sequence.
°̂ A task that is enjoyable to the subjects would blur the line between labor and
leisure and make interpretation of the results much more difficult. Subject com-
ments on finishing the experiment assured me that I had succeeded in finding a
"no-leisure" task f̂ or them to perform.
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each day of the experiment, and the order of the paragraphs is random-
ized across days.^'
Paying the subjects for each paragraph typed represents a piece-rate
wage schedule. A piece-rate wage allows work intensities to be success-
fully observed while limiting experimenter interaction. If an hourly wage
were used, the experimenter must then be concerned with monitoring and
shirking. Let us subsequently refer to this piece-rate waged merely as the
"wage," denoted w. There is also a fixed payment F that serves as
nonlabor income for the experiment. The amount of F is exogenous for
the subject at the start of the experiment. After the first work day, wages
are increased for some subjects and decreased for others in order to see if
subjects responded differently to wage increases and decreases. When
performing this income-compensated wage change on a subsequent work
day, F is varied by an amount that depends on total paragraphs typed on
the first day.
In order to avoid subjects merely typing as fast as they can to earn
money but ignoring the quality of their work, a simple quality control
scheme is used. Subjects that print a paragraph of output in which more
than five mistakes are found by the experimenter are not paid for that
unit. A mistake is any deviation from the exact paragraph to be copied
that is spotted by the experimenter (e.g., spelling, punctuation, spacing).
This is all carefully explained to the subjects in the instructions.^^
The first combination of w and F, called w^ and F^, is the baseline
treatment A. For all subjects in both experimental designs, w^ = $.15 and
F^ = $13.00 for those subjects that would subsequently receive a wage
increase and w^ = $.45 and F^ = $5.00 for those that would receive a
wage decrease. Pilot experiments helped to determine these as suitable
levels of w and F for motivating the subjects.^^ Subjects then receive
either a wage increase or a wage decrease with approximately half receiv-
^̂  Pilot experiments revealed that subjects remember substantial portions of the
paragraph on the following day when the same paragraph was used on all 4 days.
Choosing paragraphs of the same difficulty level controls for this type of learning.
Any possible learning within an experimental work day is not controlled for in
this design.
^̂  In only one of all the experimental days did a subject not get credit for a
paragraph. This happened on the first day of the experiment, which is merely a
training day, and does not alter the data analysis in this article.
" While the first day of experimentation is not used in the data analysis or
reported in this article, subjects were paid w = $.30 and F = $4.00 for that day,
and the data are available on request. In general, the wage must be high enough to
offset any possible source of outside income that the subjects may choose to earn
by leaving the experiment as soon as possible. A high enough wage also ensures
that the m'otivating factor for staying and working is earning income, and the
motivating factor for leaving is that the subject has chosen his or her optimal
amount of labor supplied.
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Table 1
Experimental
Wage increase
Subjects
Wage decrease
Subjects
Design
Day A*
•w^= .15
FI = 13.00
w^ = .45
Fa = 5.00
Day B*
Wi, = .45
Fi, < 13.oot
Wi, = .15
Fi,> 5.00t
DayC*
w^ = .45
F, = 13.00
w^ = .15
F, = 5.00
* Recall that these are actually days 2, 3, and 4 of the experiment. The first day of the
experiment was training. Days B and C were randomized in order so that some subjects
faced an ABC design, while others faced an ACB design.
t The exact amount of nonwage income on these days depends on the number of
paragraphs typed on day A. The Slutsky compensations are such that if the subject would
have typed the same number of paragraphs on day B as on day A, the subject would have
earned the same amount of wage plus nonwage income.
ing a wage decrease and half receiving a wage increase. The final two days
of the experiment allow for the decomposition of the wage change. Day
B consists of an income-compensated wage change. Wages and nonwage
income are changed to Wy and Fy, where Fy is the new level of F needed
to make the original (total income) choice point from day A attainable if
the subject types the same number of paragraphs as on day A. Day C then
returns nonwage income back to its original (day A) level while paying
wages w^ = Wy. The comparison of outcomes on days A and C gives us
an income effect, while comparing days A and B gives us a substitution
effect. On day A, subjects did not know what future wages or nonwage
income would be, not even whether they would rise or fall. The 3-day
experimental design is summarized by table 1.
Payment information is private information for each individual. Any
possible wealth effects, if they exist in laboratory settings, are not con-
trolled for in this design.̂ '*
In the Intensity Experiment, subjects are required to stay and work
for the full 2-hour experimental day. The only choice being made in
the Intensity Experiment, therefore, is h^. In the Combined Experi-
ment, subjects are free to perform their "job" for as long as they would
like up to a 2-hour limit.-̂ * Once a subject does not care to work
* For a discussion of methods of controlling for wealth effects, see Davis and
Holt (1993). Most of the concern over wealth effects has been in the context of
lottery choices. Cox and Epstein (1989) do not find much evidence for wealth
effects on lottery-choice experiments, but others (Ang and Schwarz 1985) have
not ruled out wealth effects, although other possible explanations accompany
wealth-effect explanations of risk premiums. More effort needs to be expended to
document the existence of wealth effects.
^̂  Given this rule, rationed labor supply is a potential issue. If individuals
would otherwise choose h greater than 2 hours—meaning the constraint is
binding—then the substitution effects are nonexistent for wage increases. Ashen-
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anymore, he collects an IOU for that experimental day's earnings, and
then he leaves. In the Combined Experiment, subjects are therefore
choosing both h and h^.
Subjects are required to complete a minimum number of paragraphs in
the Combined Experiment. We do this for two reasons. First, it helps
eliminate possible feelings of obligation to work in order to cooperate
with the experimenter, even though the subjects would rather leave.
Second, it can be thought of as simulating a minimum amount of labor to
be supplied in order to survive and continue on to the next day. The
minimum amount is otherwise arbitrary and is three paragraphs.^*
Since each subject serves as his own baseline, differences in preferences
pose no problem in the comparative static analysis. It is irrelevant that we
cannot distinguish between a slow typer and a fast typer who takes breaks
since what is important is how each subject reacts to his own compen-
sated piece-rate wage change. In fact, preference heterogeneity is expected
in the laboratory just as in the naturally occurring economy. The simple
foundation on which these experiment designs work is that subjects bring
their own homegrown preferences into the lab to perform labor tasks,
facing payment packages {w and F) with differing marginal and average
payoffs.^''
IV. Experimental Results
All experimental subjects were undergraduates at the University of
Arizona who were recruited from economics courses. Total experimental
costs (including pilot experiments) were $3,084. Payoffs for the 15 sub-
jects in the Intensity Experiment ranged from $5.32 to $11.58 an hour for
the 2-hour session (plus a $5.00 show up fee on the first day) with an
average hourly payoff of $8.22. Hourly payoffs for the 26 subjects in the
felter (1980) discusses this in the context of aggregate labor supply. Ham (1982)
also notes that this would cause least squares estimates of a variable's effect on h
to be misstated. However, it is difficult to know whether or not subjects are truly
constrained when choosing the maximum level of h. Furthermore, in only about
5% of the experimental work days of this article did subjects choose the upper
limit of 2 hours, and it seems to be of limited importance for interpretation of the
results of these experiments.
*̂ Border solutions occurred for only a minority of the subjects. Out of a
possible 78 days (26 subjects for 3 days each), on only 14 days did subjects work
the minimum amount, and on only 4 days did they work the maximum.
^^ It is true that some degree of control is lost by allowing subjects to choose
when they leave the experiment, but such a labor supply experiment cannot be
made interesting with induced-valued'theory (which would induce value upon
leisure choices by paying subjects to enjoy leisure). The trade-off is worthwhile
when one considers that real preferences are being examined.
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Combined Experiment ranged from $8.10 to $36.24 (plus a $5.00 show up
fee on the first day) with an average hourly payoff of $16.28.^^
The Intensity Experiment
We will first discuss the Intensity Experiment since its environment
allows for only one leisure choice: the on-the-job leisure choice. The
Intensity Experiment was run on 15 subjects.^^ Recall that in the Intensity
Experiment, subjects must work the full 2-hour session each day, and
therefore they choose h^. The best proxy for A^ on a given day is the
average paragraph production time that moves in the opposite direction
of h.^. In other words, a subject who works harder on different experi-
mental days will exhibit a lower average paragraph production time on
the day in which he or she chooses a higher ^^.•'° Wages, nonwage
income, average paragraph production times, and the signs of the wage
effects are reported in table 2.
From table 2 we see that the substitution effect has the predicted
positive sign in 11 of 15 cases—when given a compensated wage increase
(decrease), subjects worked harder (less hard). In other words, when
subjects cannot choose h, the Intensity Model appears to describe behav-
ior rather well. This can be viewed as a very conservative test of the
theory since subjects had no on-the-job leisure possibihties other than
working less hard (i.e., no talking among colleagues, coffee breaks, etc.).
A negative income effect here implies that on-the-job leisure is a normal
good for nine of 15 subjects, while total wage effects show that nine of 15
subjects displayed an upward sloping h^ supply curve.
Given the size of the data set from the Intensity Experiment (45 data
points —15 subjects for 3 days each), we are not claiming to be able to
estimate population parameters, and we are clearly limited in terms of
^^ The overall higher hourly payment in the Combined Experiment results
from the subjects having the option of leaving relatively early in the day and
keeping their entire fixed payment. Per person total compensation was actually
higher in the Intensity Experiment.
^̂  It should be noted that on the third experimental day for subjects 1-4 the
printer being used became inoperable during the last 10 minutes of the experi-
ment. Subjects were still able to type, and the resulting paragraph times were
replaced with that subject's mean production time for that day. This is an
unbiased estimate of the production times of the subjects since subjects are
assumed by theory to choose h.^ for the day and not for each individual para-
graph. The whole problem involved replacing production times for no more than
three paragraphs for any of these subjects.
°̂ Since h is fixed in the Intensity Experiment, one could also use the total
number of paragraphs typed in a day as a proxy for h.^. Such a proxy would not
work, however, in the Combined Experiment since the average paragraph pro-
duction time would then be confounded by the choice of h.
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Table 2
Intensity Experiment: Wages, F, Average Production Times (in Minutes),
d Si rW Eff 5an  igns
Subject
Number F
of 
Day
($)
age ffects on
A Day
Time F ($)
»«,
B
Time
Day
F{%)
C
Time
Sign of Wage Effect on ^^
Substitution Income Total
1* 5.00 6.13 10.70 6.12 5.00 6.08 - f - -
2 5.00 3.16 16.40 6.68 5.00 2.81 -I- - -
3 5.00 5.55 11.00 5.83 5.00 5.47 + - -
4 5.00 4.42 12.80 7.17 5.00 7.96 + + +
5 5.00 4.71 12.50 4.91 5.00 5.90 + + +
6 5.00 3.87 14.00 3.43 5.00 3.37 - f - -
7 5.00 5.86 11.00 6.54 5.00 7.03 + + +
8 5.00 6.85 10.10 6.80 5.00 7.44 - f + +
9 13.00 3.58 3.10 3.39 13.00 3.65 -I- - -
10 13.00 5.83 7.00 4.68 13.00 4.78 + - +
11 13.00 5.09 6.10 5.02 13.00 5.04 -I- - -I-
12 13.00 3.44 2.80 2.88 13.00 3.11 + - +
13 13.00 3.59 3.40 4.55 13.00 3.82 - f + -
14 13.00 5.22 6.10 4.73 13.00 4.81 + - +
15 13.00 4.64 2.20 4.25 13.00 4.06 -I- -I- -I-
NoTE.—The substitution effect sign is found by comparing columns 5 and 3 (keeping in mind the sign
of the wage change), the income effects by comparing columns 7 and 5, and the total effect by comparing
columns 7 and 3. Given piece-rate wages, income compensations on day B are such that if the subject
typed the same number or paragraphs on day B as on day A, total compensation would be held constant.
As a result, it is possible that different individuals are compensated the same amount even though slight
variations in average paragraph production time may exist.
* Subjects 1-8 ^ced a wage decrease {w^ = $.45, Wi, = w^ = $.15). Subjects 9-15 faced a wage
increase {w^ = $.15, w^, — w^ = $.45).
t Represents a violation of the prediction of the Intensity Model.
what statistical analyses we can do. Nevertheless, a simple regression will
allow us to calculate an average h.^ function such as
AvrTime = a + ^iwage + ^2^ + £• (9)
This ordinary least squares (OLS) model is rejected in favor of a fixed-
effects modeling, and so the estimated version of equation (9) includes
individual specific constant terms. The estimated equation is
AvrTime = 5.21 - l.51wage + .02F
(.00) (.11) (.48) ^^'
Here,/7-values are given in parentheses, and the constant term is the mean
level of fixed effect (and mean p-value). The adjusted R^ = .67 and N
^' A Lagrange Multiplier test favors a one-factor model over the classical linear
regression with no group specific effects (p = .00), and the Hausman test
suggests the fixed-effects model over the random-effects model (p = .07). The
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The income-compensated wage (substitution) effect on AvrTime from
(9') is Pi - {AvrTime)^2 = -1.61 calculated at the mean value of
AvrTime (4.98 minutes), while the compensated wage elasticity is —.10.
Therefore, the $.30 compensated increase (decrease) in the wage decreases
(increases) the average paragraph production time by about 29 seconds
(about 10%, given the mean time of 4.98 minutes). The negative substi-
tution effect implies a positive substitution effect on ^^. This result is
consistent with the predictions of the Intensity Model from equation (1).
The income effect is positive, implying that on-the-job leisure is a normal
good, but it is small in magnitude and insignificant (the total income
elasticity = .01). The uncompensated wage effect of —1.51 is marginally
insignificant and implies an average positively sloped h.^ supply curve.
Specifically, an increase (decrease) in the wage of $.30 caused AvrTime to
decrease (increase) by 27 seconds (the total wage elasticity of average
production time = -.09).^^ These results are consistent with those of the
fixed-hours environments studied in Lazear (1998) and Paarsch and
Shearer (1998d) in that, when total compensation is more tied to effort,,
effort or productivity rises.^^ What is of empirical interest from the
Intensity Experiment is that wage changes still affect labor choices in
environments in which workers cannot choose hours of work— on-the-
job leisure (or less of it) is chosen instead.
We might also be interested in the results of estimating equation (9)
when the day B data are omitted. While theoretically exogenous, nonwage
income F is not exogenous in the experimental design for day B, since it
depends upon the amount of work performed in day A. As a result, the
fixed-effect estimation results did not, however, substantially alter the coefficient
estimates over the OLS estimation of eq.,(9). While it is a rejected specification,
the OLS model will serve as a comparison to the estimated OLS model of the
Combined Experiment data. The estimated OLS equation (with robust variance
estimates allowing for nonindependence among observations of the same cross-
sectional unit) for the Intensity Experiment is AvrTime = 6.52 — 3.55wage
- .06F. The ^-values were .00, .01, and .32, respectively for a. Pi, and Pj- The
estimated OLS Pi does, however, increase the magnitude of the compensated
wage elasticity to -.20 compared to the elasticity of -.10 for the fixed-effects
specification.
•'̂  The OLS model in eq. (9) was also estimated with an additional interaction
term wageF (equal to wage * F) to see if the average level of compensation was
significant. The coefficient on this variable (.16) was highly insignificant (p
= .62), and the effect of the wage became iarger in magnitude (—4.98) and
marginally insignificant {p = .12). The effect of the variable F was still small in
magnitude (—.11) and insignificant (p = .35).
^ Specifically, Lazear reports an increase in worker productivity of at least
22% when changing to a piece-rate pay system (from an hourly wage system).
Paarsch and Shearer (1998a) find that productivity of tree-planters is about 23%
higher under piece rates than under a fixed daily wage.
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coefficient estimates will be biased if there is any correlation in the errors
across experimental work days for an individual. When omitting the day
B data, equation (9) is estimated by OLS to be: AvrTime = 6.60
— l.70wage - .14F. The/7-values for a. Pi, and P2 ^.re, respectively, .00,
.28, and .03. The real difference here is that most of the significance is now
in nonwage income F (estimated to be an inferior good). The wage effect,
while statistically insignificant, still supports the implication of the In-
tensity Model from equation (1).̂ "*
The Combined Experiment
The Combined Experiment allows subjects to choose h as well as ^^ by
allowing subjects to leave whenever they choose during an experimental
session. This experimental design was run on 26 subjects. The results are
summarized in tables 3 and 4. Wages, nonwage income, average paragraph
production times, and total minutes worked are shown in table 3. From
table 3 we can calculate the signs of the substitution, income, and total
wage effects on h as well as the sign of the compensated wage effect on
h^. These effects are then shown in table 4.
From table 4 we can see that off-the-job leisure is a normal good for 14
of 26 subjects, and labor supply curves are upward sloping in 19 of 26
cases. We also see that the classical static labor supply theory is violated
(i.e., there are negative substitution effects onh)[n eight of 26 cases.''^ The
fact that eight of 26 subjects displayed negative substitution effects on h
suggests that on- and off-the-job leisure are strong substitutes for some
individuals. It is even possible that all 26 subjects substitute on- and
off-the-job leisure, but that the two types of leisure are only weak
substitutes for those subjects who display a positive substitution effect on
h. This is evidence in support of the Combined Model of labor supply.
-^'^ This is not estimated with a fixed-effects modeling since the regressors are
colinear. Specifically, there is no variation in the individual-specific constant terms
nor in F once day B data are omitted.
•'̂  One may think that individual occurrences of negative hours of work
responses (consistent with a downward sloping labor supply function) may be
attributed to income targeting. The typical explanation of loss aversion or a point
of nondifferentiability in the utility function at an income target would require
subjects to treat off-the-job leisure as a normal good in order to smooth income.
In fact, in all but one subject (subject 18) who displayed a downward sloping
hours supplied function, off-the-job leisure is a normal good. However, with two
different leisure choices available, the strong substitution off on- and off-the-job
leisure (with / being an inferior good) could also produce downward sloping
hours supplied functions. The experimental data offer some support of this
theory. Most instances of negative labor supply response (five of seven) are due to
a negative substitution effect on h that is theoretically consistent with the strong
substitution of / and hj.
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Table 3
Combined Experiment: Wages, F, Average Production Times, and Total
Work Time (in Minutes)
Subject
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Day
Average
Time
3.57
8.35
4.45
4.03
3.66
3.07
5.22
6.69
4.41
5.58
3.51
5.20
7.54
4.77
10.78
8.32
4.43
4.80
4.13
5.09
6.14
5.76
3.81
6.55
7.12
11.57
A»
Total
Time
99.96
41.75
22.25
76.57
87.84
101.31
52.20
80.28
110.25
106.20
91.26
62.40
22.62
114.48
32.34
41.60
57.59
67.20
78.47
30.54
30.70
28.80
19.05
19.65
21.36
34.71
Wage ($)
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.15
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
Day
f ($)
13.40
6.50
6.50
10.70
12.20
14.90
8.00
8.60
12.50
10.70
12.80
8.60
5.90
5.80
12.10
11.50
9.10
8.80
7.30
11.20
11.50
11.50
11.20
12.10
12.10
12.40
Bt
Average
Time
3.31
7.93
4.11
3.09
3.30
2.76
4.73
6.33
4.09
5.65
3.44
4.61
7.31
4.91
12.04
7.22
4.55
5.75
3.79
4.02
6.39
6.12
3.58
3.97
5.92
10.24
Total
Time
23.17
23.79
41.10
61.80
105.60
8.28
28.38
25.32
28.63
28.25
120.4
23.05
21.93
49.10
96.32
72.20
72.80
23.00
102.33
44.22
19.17
55.08
121.72
11.92
100.64
30.72
Day
Average
Time
3.22
7.69
4.25
3.41
3.09
3.28
5.42
7.55
3.69
6.18
3.55
5.24
6.99
5.07
11.62
7.26
4.62
5.12
3.92
3.95
5.99
5.94
3.62
4.39
5.73
8.88
ct
Total
Time
16.10
23.07
63.75
68.20
12.36
13.12
21.68
30.20
36.90
24.72
120.7
20.96
20.97
40.56
69.72
65.34
83.16
51.20
70.56
90.85
17.97
23.76
21.72
43.90
103.14
124.32
*For subjects 1-13, wage = $.45, F = $5.00. For subjects 14-26, wage = $.15, F = $13.00.
t Compensation is the same in the Intensity Experiment. Occasionally the total time typed exceeds 120
minutes (the 2-hour limit) because subjects were allowed to finish the paragraph that they were typing
when reaching the time limit.
% For subjects 1-13, wage = $.15, F = $5.00. For subjects 14-25, wage = $.45, F = $13.00.
Additional evidence is found in the last column of table 4. Here, we see
that 17 oi 26 (65%) subjects display negative substitution effects on h^.
We can contrast this to only four of 15 (27%) subjects displaying negative
substitution effects on h.^ in the Intensity Experiment. These negative
substitution effects on work effort (not just on hours of work) are also
consistent with the Combined Model (see Sec. II). Yet such a prediction
is at odds with the Intensity Model—a model supported by data from the
Intensity Experiment. Empirically, we can see that when workers choose
their hours of work, workers respond to wage changes by altering both
hours of work and work effort.
A simple regression oi h onz constant, the wage, and nonwage income
can aid us in determining whether or not the predictions of the classical
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Table 4
Combined Experiment*
Effects on Hours of Work
Subject Substitution Income Total Wage Compensated Wage
Number Effect Effect Effect Eiiea on h^
1 + + +
2 1 I
~r T
•1 4.
4 + - + +
5 -f + +
6 + - +
7 + + +
8 1 _L
9 + - +
10 + + + +
11 -f
12 + + +
13 + + +
14 -t - -
15 + - +
16 + - + +
17 + + +
18 -t + -
19 + - - +
20 + + + +
21 -t - -
22 + - -
23 + - + +
24 -f + + +
25 + + + +
26 -f + + +
* Signs of wage and income effects on h. Sign of compensated wage effect on h^.
t Represents a violation of the prediction of the classical static labor leisure choice model. The
substitution, income, and total wage effect signs are found by comparing the appropriate total time
columns from table 3. The compensated wage effect on /;„ is found by comparing average time from days
A and B. Again, keep in mind tbe direction of the wage change when mailing tbe comparisons.
model are consistent with the findings of the Combined Experiment. The
equation of estimation is
b = a + ^^wage + PJ^ + £• (10)
The data do not support a fixed-effects modeling of equation (10). There-
fore, equation (10') is the result of the OLS estimation of equation (13)
with /7-values in parentheses.^^ Variance estimates implicit in equation
*̂ The possibility of fixed or random effects was explored. For the specification
in eq. (10) we find no support for fixed or random effects. As with the estimation
of eq. (9) for the Intensity Experiment, eq. (10) was estimated with an additional
interaction term wage * F. As with the Intensity Experiment data, this variable
does not have a significant effect on h, and its inclusion into the specification
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(10') are robust, allowing for the possible nonindependence of observa-
tions within a cross-sectional unit. The R'^ = .14 and N = 78.
h = 28.03 + S3.00wage + .03/='
(.04) (.01) (.98) • (^°')
We see that at the aggregate level, the only significant variable in
determining total time spent working is the wage. The constant is signif-
icant and, in part, reflects the minimum number of paragraphs that each
subject had to type. The hours supplied function is upward sloping and
implies that an increase (decrease) in the wage of $.30 will increase
(decrease) minutes worked by about 25 minutes.^^ Off-the-job leisure is
an inferior good on average, although the effect of F is statistically
insignificant and very small in magnitude.
The income-compensated wage (substitution) effect on h is ^^ - h^2
= 81.40, calculated at the mean value of h (53.19 minutes). A compen-
sated increase in the wage of $.30 would then increase total time worked
by 24 minutes. The elasticities calculated from equation (10'), evaluated at
the mean values of h and w are an income-compensated wage elasticity of
.46, a total income elasticity of .01, and an uncompensated wage elasticity
of total minutes worked of .47. The estimated income-compensated wage
elasticity of .46 is high but not without company in the empirical litera-
ture (see Pencavel [1986] for examples).''^ A summary of the elasticity
results from both experiments is in table 5.̂ ^
The estimation results in equation (10') imply that the predictions of
the classical model of labor supply are consistent with the empirical
findings of the Combined Experiment. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
lowers the significance of the wage effect top = .01 (the sign of all other effects
remained the same).
•''' It is possible that subjects react differently to a wage increase than to a wage
decrease. To explore this possibility an equation similar to eq. (10), but which
included a dummy variable that equaled one for those subjects that received a
wage decrease, did not qualitatively alter any of the estimated coefficients with the
exception of the coefficient on F that, while still insignificant, had an estimated
negative coefficient (still small in magnitude at —.30). The insignificance of the
dummy variable leads us to reject the hypothesis that subjects respond differently
(in terms of magnitude of change) when faced with a wage decrease.
•** If we omit the data from day B, as was done with the Intensity Experiment
data, the results are not appreciably altered. The hours of work equation is then
estimated to be: h = 28.61 -t- 91.24wage - .22F. Thep-values of a, p,, and P2
are, respectively, .04, .00, and .84.
' ' Oettinger (1998) also studies labor supply elasticities, but he focuses on the
labor participation decision and finds a participation elasticity of about .60 for
baseball stadium vendors.
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Table 5
Elasticities on h and h^ in the Combined and Intensity Experiments
Intensity
Experiment Combined Experiment
Specific Elasticity Average Time Minutes Worked Average Time*
Compensated wage —.10 .46 —.02
Total income .01 .01 - .01
Total wage - .09 .47 - .03
' These average paragraph production time elasticities for the Combined Experiment are from a simple
random-effects model (favored over an OLS and fixed-effects specification by the Lagrange Multiplier
and Hausman tests). Both wage and income effects were statistically insignificant, however, and these
results should be interpreted with caution. The estimated model is AvrTime = 5.99 — .55wage — .04f.
The p-values for a, p , , and P2 ̂ r^i respectively, .00, .23, and .20.
wage response implied in equation (10') does not reveal the full labor
supply response of the workers. We also note that the predictions of the
Combined Model are consistent with observed negative substitution
effects on hours worked for several individuals. The same cannot be said
of the classical model. These experimental results imply that on-the-job
leisure (lower work effort) is not only significant enough to consume in
a restricted experimental setting, but also that the hours of work choice
significantly influences a worker's choice of effort. Most workers re-
sponded to a compensated wage increase in the Combined Experiment by
decreasing work effort, yet in the Intensity Experiment these wage in-
creases generally increased effort.
V. Concluding Remarks
A desirable feature of any theory is its ability to predict outcomes. The
classical labor supply model has been widely implemented in empirical
studies and has found, for the most part, support in the data. Its predic-
tions are inconsistent, however, with a nontrivial number of empirically
estimated negative substitution effects on hours of work. The Combined
Model in this article extends the classical theory by allowing for a dual
labor supply choice: hours of work and work effort. This Combined
Model is consistent with empirically estimated negative substitution ef-
fects in the literature. Such negative substitution effects on hours worked
can result when on- and off-the-job leisure are substitute goods. Further-
more, even when substitution effects on hours worked are positive, the
Combined Model suggests that these effects are not the full representation
of the workers' labor supply response.
This article also employs a distinctive approach for testing labor eco-
nomic theories that complements the growing body of field data on piece
rates and labor supply. We have used controlled laboratory experiments
to observe subjects' homegrown preferences for labor and leisure. Such
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experiments are cost-effective real economic environments that are capa-
ble of generating data that do not exist in the field. The Combined
Experiment provides sufficiently detailed data to test the Combined
Model, and the results are consistent with the implications of the model.
We find both positive and negative substitution effects on hours of work,
with the "average" substitution effect being positive. Such results direct
us to include measures of work effort as well as hours of work in our
econometric models. While we know of no field data that provide both
hours of work and effort information, estimated substitution effects based
on only hours of work are an incomplete measure of the total response to
a compensated wage change. Employers are presumably most interested
in the total response when exploring the effects of a wage change on the
firm's production.
In addition to the results of the Combined Experiment, the Intensity
Experiment is also of interest because it recreates the fixed-hours envi-
ronment of many short-run labor supply decisions. Compensated wage
decreases significantly decrease average production times, which has im-
portant implications for human resource management. Specifically, more
work effort can be elicited by giving income-compensated wage increases
to employees. Such income compensations might involve reducing a
worker's nonpecuniary compensation (health benefits, vacation time,
etc.). The point is that employers may be able to elicit higher effort levels,
while still holding overall compensation constant at a base effort level, by
tying more of the compensation package to work effort.
Appendix A
Derivation of Substitution and Income Effects
in the Combined Model
For simplicity we define the utility function in terms of three goods
(consumption and the two leisure goods) instead of goods and "bads."
The time and budget constraints allow us to translate the results from
wage effects on leisure to wage effects and hours of work and work effort.
Let the utility function be quasi concave; twice continuously differen-
tiable; and increasing in consumption c, off-the-job leisure /, and on-the-
job leisure hi. Therefore, we have U = t/(c, /, hi) with U,. > 0, Ui> 0,
Uhi > 0. For notational simplicity we henceforth refer to goods c, I, and
hi as goods 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Therefore, £/„ ^i> ^h will be
referred to as [/j, U2, and t/3 (with similar numeric notation for higher
order derivatives).
The constraints on behavior are the following: wh^ + F = pc (the
budget constraint), h + I = T (the time constraint), and h.^ + hi = h (the
work time constraint), where F is exogenous (nonwage) income, w is the
wage that is only paid per hour of productive labor, T is total time
available, and ^^ is productive hours spent at work. Notice that a given
choice of / and hi will define h and h.^. We now normalize the price of the
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consumption good to p = 1. The budget constraint can then be written
zswT— wl — whi -I- î  — c = 0. It is important to realize from the time
constraint that the wage effect on h will just be the negative of the wage
effect on /. The same cannot be said for h^ and hi since the sign of h^ is
also dependent upon the choice of h, not just hi.
The first-order conditions from the constrained maximization problem are:
- X. = 0
= 0
wT — wl — whi + F — c = 0.
(Al)
From these we see that U2/U2 = 1. For
dii
2 1 3 1 22
future reference, we also note that the quasi-concavity condition guaran-
tees that the bordered determinant of the utility function behaves as
follows:
\B\ =
0 t/, U2 f/3
U, Un Un t/,3
f/3 t/3, f/32
< 0
(A2)
U,
[/, U2
U,
> 0
0 f/,
[/, Un
In particular, from the conditions on the first and second principal
minors, together with symmetry conditions, we have
0
0 (A3)
and also f/n < 0, t/22 ^ 0> t/33 < 0- By using the first-order conditions,
the first three equations in equation (A3) reduce to
t/33 - -li^^t/,!
- t / 3 3 - t/22
(A3')
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Now, given the equation system defined in equation (Al), if partial
derivatives are all continuous with respect to all the endogenous variables
(\, c, /, and hi) and exogenous variables {w and F), and if the Jacobian
determinant of the system of equations in (Al) is nonzero, then there
exists a neighborhood in which equation (Al) defines a set of implicit
functions for the maximands:
hi = hiiw, F)
c = c{w, F)
1 = liw, F)
\ = \{w, F)
(A4)
(we will subsequently drop the bar notation for the optimal values of each
choice variable). The condition on the Jacobian determinant is guaranteed
to be satisfied, however, since we note that
1/1 =
0 —1 —w —w
- 1 f/,, f/,, f/,3
-w f/21 U^i f/23
-W f/31 [/32 f/33
= \H\ (A5)
(the bordered Hessian of the constrained problem).
Second-order conditions for utility maximization imply that \H\ < 0
and so we know that the Jacobian determinant is nonzero, the conditions
of the Implicit Function Theorem are satisfied, and this gives each equa-
tion of (Al) the status of identity in the neighborhood of interest. It also
guarantees that the implicit functions defined in equation (A4) are con-
tinuous and have continuous partial derivatives with respect to the exog-
enous variables w and F.
The Comparative Static Analysis
Next, we totally differentiate each equation in (Al) and arrange to get
-d\ + + = 0
-wdX + U2idc + U22dl + U2idhi = Xdw
-wdk + U^dc + [/32J/ -I- Uiidhi = Xdw-de - wdl - wdhi
= Idw + hidw — dF - Tdw.
(A6)
Notice that the right-hand side of the last equation in (A6) can be written
instead as -de - wdl - wdhi = -h^dw - dF. We first find the
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income effect by setting dw = 0 in equation (A6), dividing each equation
through by dF and interpreting the ratios of differentials as partial
derivatives. The result is
-ax
+
dc dl
^ + Un Jp = 0
ax
ax
U2
dl
a/
dhi
^ = 0
(A7)
-de dl dhi
dF dF dF
Or, in matrix form.
0
- 1
~w
~w
- 1
Un
t/21
C/3.
—w
Un
t/22
C/32
—w
Un
t/23
t/33
dk/dF
dc/dF
dl/dF
dh,/dF
- 1
0
0
0
(A7')
Here, the 4 X 4 matrix is the bordered Hessian, whose determinant is
identical to the determinant of the Jacobian matrix J. Now, confining our
attention to the two variables of interest (/ and hi), we can use Cramer's
rule to find the two income effects
-1 Un t/,3
-w Un t/23
-W C/31 C/33
-1 Un Un
-w Un t/22
-w C/31 t/32
• (A8)
Next, we find the effect of an uncompensated wage change by setting dF
= 0 and dividing equation (A6) through by dw to yield the matrix
equation
0 —1 —w —w
- 1 Un Un t/,3
-W C/21 t/22 t/23
-w C/,, t/32 U 33
dkjdw
dc/dw
dl/dw
dhi/dw
-h^
0
X
X
(A9)
From this, the two partial derivatives of interest emerge
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dl 0 - 1
- 1 Un
-W Un
I/I
-w
f/,3
-1 Un Un
-w [/21 C/23
-w Un C/33
X
UT
0 - 1 -w
- 1 f/,, C/,3
-w Uji f/23
(AlO)
-X.
I/I
h
0
- 1
—w
V
- 1
— te;
—w
- 1
Un
C/3,
C/n
C/2,
C/,2
C/32
C/,2
c/22
c/32
1̂71
0
- 1
~w
- 1
c/,.
c/2.
—w
Un
C/22
= 74 + 7-5 + 7,.
(All)
From equations (AlO) and (All) we can refer to the T, terms to simplify
our analysis of these uncompensated wage effects.
Notice that from equations (A8) we can write T^ and T̂  as
h^idl/dF) and h.^{dhi/dF), respectively. Therefore, T^ and T^ are the in-
come effects for / and h/.
Next, in order to see how an income-compensated substitution effect is
reflected in equations (AlO) and (All), notice that by holding dF = 0 we
can rewrite the constraint equation from (A6) as
—dc — wdl —
Since the effectual change in income that the worker experiences is then
h^dw, we compensate the consumer by setting h^ = 0 when changing
the wage. As such, the vector of constants from equation (A9) is now
[0 0 \ \ ] ' instead oi[-h^O W]'. Given this new vector of constants we
now can find the income-compensated wage effects on / and h^.
dwj\. . I/I
income compensated '•' '
0 - 1 -w
-1 Un Un
-w Un f/33 I7f
0 - 1 -w
-1 Un Un
-w f/21 f/23
(A12)
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_ - \
income compensated '• ' '
0
- 1
—w
— 1 —w
Un Un
Un f/32
\
I/I
0 - 1 -w
-1 Un Un
-w U21 U22
= T,+ 75. (A13)
And so, as usual, we can write the uncompensaled wage effects as a
combination of a substitution and an income effect
dl I dl
dw \dwl I .
income compensated
dw \.
jp and
(A14)
income compensated
In general, the income effects have no theoretical sign, but usually we
would predict that these substitution effects be theoretically negative. In
the combined model, however, we cannot theoretically sign the substi-
tution effect, either.
Determining the Sign of the Combined Substitution Effect
To see that the combined model can produce theoretically negative sub-
stitution effects on hours of work (which corresponds here to showing that
we can have theoretically positive substitution effects on hours of leisure), let
us expand the substitution effect terms in equations (A12) and (A13) to get
dl
~d^j\. , ~ 171
' income compensated
A.
J\
7-
0
- 1
—w
wUn
- 1
Un
- f / 3 3
—w
f/l3
f/33
-1- u
X
/v
1 T\
I/I
f̂/u - '
0
- 1
~w
w^Un
- 1
Un
f/2,
]
—w
f/,3
C/23
(A15)
dw income compensated
- X
ITT
0
- 1
—w
- 1
f/u
f/3,
—Z^;
f/,2
C/32
-1- \T\
0
- 1
- 1
c/,1
f/21
C/,2
f/22
= TJJ [^t/21 - U22
(A16)
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Notice that the first term in both equations (A15) and (A16) is guaranteed
to be negative given equation (A3') that followed from quasi concavity,
and the fact that we know the Jacobian determinant to be negative. This
should not be surprising since these terms represent the standard substi-
tution effect in each case. The sign of the additional term will depend on
some theoretical assumptions. In rewriting equations (A15) and (A16)
once again, we have
(A17)
dw \. , \\dw \.
income compensated '̂  ^ ' income compensated
where
dl
I income compensated
would be the usual (negatively signed) substitution effect on /.
income compensated dwl .income compensated
(A18)
where
dhi
dw
income compensated
would be the usual (negatively signed) substitution effect on hi.
Notice the symmetry in equations (A17) and (A18). It is obvious from
the possible combinations of signs in the second portion of the substitu-
tion effect that this portion could be positive and, if stronger than the
negative portion of the substitution effect, could create an overall positive
substitution effect on / or hi. Given the time constraint, a positive
substitution effect on / would correspond directly to a negative substi-
tution effect on h. The assumptions necessary for this to occur are
discussed in Section II of the article.
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